Building the wrong product

[10-2026 / English / 2679 words]

This year has been crazy. Since my last retrospective, I pivoted my growth agency to a product-led B2B SaaS with my business cofounder, scaled IbexAI to $2k MRR, and shut it down in September. We built a working marketing channel, and achieved a steady stream of paying self-serve signups. Ironically, by getting distribution right this time, I had earned the privilege of failing in a new way: seeing my customers overwhelmingly choose to cancel their subscriptions, no matter how hard I tried or how many features I built. Because I didn't solve their actual problem. In this post I'm sharing my new learnings on product and business development, and how important it is to always listen to your users (especially if you don't like what they're telling you).

Running a startup will make you feel lots of emotions

Building the prototype

IbexAI grew organically out of the outreach agency that I had started at the Harvard i-lab. On a whim last year, I built a small command-line tool to find high-intent leads for our own prospecting. At that time, our primary growth channel was LinkedIn outbound, and the main bottleneck we saw was that we could only reach out to 500 prospects monthly per account. That's why we had to be very picky about who to contact.

AI had just begun to get cheap, so it was suddenly possible to deep-scan thousands of profiles to check whether they fit our ideal customer profile (ICP). This was a big improvement over naive role-based targeting. However, our main innovation was to combine that ICP check with an actual intent signal: we only considered prospects that recently commented or liked one of our competitor's LinkedIn posts. This was not a guarantee that prospects wanted to buy from us, but it proved two important things. First, that a specific topic was on their mind (for our leads: outbound agency services). And second, that they had been active within the last 24 hours (70% of LinkedIn users rarely use the platform, and only 10% log in daily).

The tool worked great. We scraped 10k+ interactions per day across all our direct competitors, and reached out to only the most engaged prospects fitting our ICP. This almost doubled our acceptance rate to 60%+, and strongly increased all downstream stats (booked meetings, onboarded clients). The next step was obvious: packaging the tool as a SaaS and selling high-intent leads to others doing LinkedIn outreach.

Getting paying customers

Running our own agency made it easy to do a first demand test. Our existing clients were already paying us $499/month to get their LinkedIn outreach managed, so an extra $59/month for high-intent leads was a quick sale. The results for them were less good than for ourselves, but still positive. We learned that for the tool to be useful, the user's prospects needed to be active LinkedIn users, and additionally there needed to be a group of competitors getting lots of engagement on their posts.

To find customers that fit these constraints, we had to play 3D chess in a B2B2B fashion. Our ideal user was someone who themselves was targeting another audience on LinkedIn, and both the user and their audience needed to be actively engaging with relevant discourse on the platform. We ran two pilots that we thought promising in that regard: sales coaches (they're highly active on LinkedIn and target founders who are also active), and LinkedIn ghostwriters (they're even more active, and write content for other professionals who want to become micro influencers). Both groups were interested in high-intent leads, but didn't want to pay.

As a small test, we also reached out to a few early-stage B2B founders. This group didn't fit our own criteria, because founders have completely different audiences themselves. But they were actually willing to pay for good leads. So we went all in on the founders, put up a landing page to collect emails, and got about 20 waitlist signups through LinkedIn. Posting on Reddit and Indiehackers turned out to be even more effective, and we hit 100 emails after just two weeks.

Where our users came from (only showing Jun-Sep)

Surprisingly, marketing actually works

After months of trying to find the right audience, suddenly everything went very fast. While my cofounder focused on scaling up the marketing, I transformed our command-line tool into an actual self-serve product. This was a pretty hacky webapp with just two screens behind a Stripe paywall. But it was enough to launch quickly to our waitlist of 114 people. We gave them a 50% early bird discount, got six signups, and doubled our revenue. To celebrate this win, we printed out the first $29 Stripe invoice. Seeing people buy our product without any pre-existing relationship or sales effort really validated the problem space for us.

So we ramped up the marketing hard and got real traction in January: 5-timing our MRR from $300 to $1.5k in just one month! We had finally found the hockeystick! Almost all of this was inbound traffic from Reddit and Indiehackers. We posted daily on r/saas, r/startups, r/buildinpublic, and similar subreddits where our ideal customers (early-stage founders) were hanging out. Our content strategy was a mix of helpful advice (sharing startup learnings) and ironic shitposting (entrepreneurship memes & parody content).

Meme that resonated with our ideal customers on Reddit

The overarching topic we centered all our posts around was the pain point of finding customers. Every post linked to our landing page, which drove lots of qualified traffic. That month, 21 people bought a subscription at our regular rate of $59/month. I woke up most mornings to find Stripe notifications of new purchases, which was a great way to start the day.

Mixpanel report showing unique visits to our landing page (we only started tracking at the end of February)

TERRIBLE churn :'(

It started with a few cancellations, and one refund request. But it kept going. And increased. And didn't stop! All the marketing brought in lots of interested people, and many bought. But 84% churned within the first month, and 8% even canceled in the first 3 days! We basically churned all our customers every month, which meant that we had to keep our marketing going in frantic mode just to keep the MRR flat. Slowing down only a little in February made our revenue immediately dip.

Having a 30-day money-back guarantee helped me a lot to keep my peace of mind. It was important for me to know that if we disappointed a customer, they had an easy way out. That allowed me to not feel guilty for building something that clearly didn't meet most people's expectations. Interestingly, less than 10% of the customers that canceled in their first month even asked for a refund, which made the guarantee also pretty cheap to offer.

Asking users but not listening

What we had was the exact opposite of product-market fit. The first step in fixing something is getting data on what's wrong, so I started reaching out to all of our customers. About 20% replied with feedback on the product, and I got some of them on calls to tell me more. I asked open-ended questions in the style of Mom Test, transcribed the calls, made notes in our CRM (I found Attio much better than Hubspot), and created Linear tickets from the results. This was great to get an overview of our user base, see the relative frequency of complaints, and prioritize feature requests.

Some customers mentioned platform bugs or were confused by the UI. But overall the feedback was pretty clear: the leads weren't relevant enough. This confirmed what I had feared all along. Founders as an audience look fairly homogenous on the surface, but are actually a complete hodgepodge of user personas. Our customers' target audiences were as diverse as HR leaders, Tiktok agencies, MedTech companies, sales teams, and train operators. In most cases those groups weren't active on LinkedIn, or there wasn't enough interaction around our customers' specific topic. For example, a startup targeting cybersecurity professionals couldn't find enough leads because there were too few influencers in that niche actively posting on LinkedIn.

Not actually solving the problem

At this point, I had more than enough data to know what our issue was. We didn't have anything approaching an ICP, we just had a diverse herd of unserved customers. Deep down inside I already knew that it would be impossible to find good leads for everybody. But I was in denial. So I racked my brain on how to nevertheless create value for all of them.

The temptation is real

Of course there was no shortage of things wrong with the app. Our product looked ugly, was confusing to use, and the onboarding was just me sending users a link to a dense FAQ page. Every morning I woke up to error logs with newly discovered bugs from the overnight runs of our LinkedIn scraper. And at some point the database suddenly decided to die. I had a memorably terrible 3 days of porting the constantly crashing Sqlite database to a fresh Mysql one.

So instead of actually addressing the main reason that our users didn't stay, I kept working on these other objectively valid, but actually totally secondary issues. I brought the backend to a clean place, redesigned all the screens to make them easier to understand, added new lead filters, and fixed many annoying bugs. And this version 2 of the webapp turned out to be quite nice.

Webapp version 2.0 (Signup screen, role configuration, signal selection, and lead view)

But all that didn't solve the actual problem. And it showed in the numbers: after completely rebuilding the app, retention had only improved by about 10%. Our users wanted a car, but instead of giving them something that they could drive (even if looking crappy and breaking down constantly), I worked on a nice coating and forgot to add a motor.

To free trial or not to free trial?

We had just hit $2k MRR, but that was only because of new user influx. Despite the rebuild, churn was still terrifyingly bad. It was time for another big change. Avoiding the elephant in the room (product), I thought that changing our pricing model might bring the desired improvements. My reasoning was that if we'd provide free trials, we might 10x our signups, and find the right ICP through sheer volume of users trying our tool.

So I built the free trial. It required lots of changes to our billing setup (permissions, a new user role, time-based expiration), and we needed a mechanism to avoid abuse. This was quite fun to build, and I enjoyed watching people try signing up with invalid emails and getting auto-rejected. I also built a nurturing email drip campaign that guides new users through the product, with contextual triggers for different onboarding paths (this sounds more fancy than it actually was, I just differentiated between "OK" if a user found lots of leads, and "BAD" if they didn't).

Admin list of rejected signups; dashboard showing success metrics of 7-day free trial

My first big surprise was that the free trial only doubled our signup volume (unique, valid company emails). Partially, this might have also been influenced by our marketing getting more erratic. We felt burnt out after months of daily posting, and our creative juices started to run dry. But the second, much more jarring surprise was: NOBODY CONVERTED.

I had gotten used to a constant stream of paying signups, so it was sobering to see all these trials not resulting in any new revenue. Without intending to do so, I had built the perfect experiment to prove that our product simply wasn't working. Now that people were able to test it for free, they overwhelmingly concluded that it's not worth their money.

Stripe plot of monthly recurring revenue overlaid with the different pricing and distribution phases

The tourist diagonal

To understand what was going on, I built a dot-plot dashboard with metrics of all trial users. The background color showed whether they accessed the app on that day, and the different types of dots tracked stats that I thought were indicative of the user getting value. The most significant one (fat dot) tracked clicks on the CSV export button. This meant that a user had the feeling that it was worth it to download their found leads.

Dot plot chart tracking usage stats of individual users (rows) over time (columns)

What I found was a slanted line, which I coin "the tourist diagonal". This is a very bad thing in subscription software, because it means that your retention sucks. New users look at the product, click around a bit and quickly go "nah" and leave. To combat this, I started tracking every step of the trial funnel to identify where the biggest user dropoffs occur. Then I worked on removing those bottlenecks with a proper multi-screen onboarding. I put in a lot of effort to get users quickly to their first "wow" moment: custom leads relevant to their industry. This strongly improved our onboarding completion rate, but didn't move the needle on revenue because almost no free trials converted to paid subscriptions.

Tracking each view of the onboarding funnel to improve activation rate

The purchases only started creeping back once I tightened the trial length from 14 to 7 days (with a total volume of just 9 conversions). Looking at those users' activity, I found out that they had simply forgotten to use the trial after signing up, and then only paid to still give it a try. Like before, these customers also churned quickly after their first month.

Nothing worked, and morale got low. The idea of a complete pivot seemed seductive: what if we changed our ICP and our product at the same time? (Bad idea!) We settled on providing email leads to Revops teams, and immediately encountered the normal issues of testing a new audience. Talking with revops leaders we learned that they were actually much less stressed out about outreach since their skill level was higher, and they also had longer sales cycles. In addition, we didn't even have a good marketing channel to reach them. Frustrated and exhausted, we threw in the towel and shut the platform down.

Layers of product

In my experience, there's three completely different types of work required to build a great product. The first and foundational one is marketing. This is my personal shorthand for: can we actually generate interest for our offering at a sustainable price point? Most startups fail because they haven't even picked the right problem in the first place (I made this mistake twice myself). To be successful, your customers need to feel strong pain, and you need to describe this pain well enough that they believe that you might solve it for them. The second layer is conceptually simple, but the hardest to actually pull off: does the product actually work? Build an MVP, and iterate until it does. No shortcuts. And the third layer is taking a proof-of-concept that shows traction, and improving it obsessively until it's actually great.

I stopped the foundational product work too soon, and graduated into the third layer before I actually deserved to go there. I'm convinced that even with a burning database, an AI-slop UI, and dozens of annoying bugs, you would rather find product-market fit by making big changes early on, than by fixing all those comparatively smaller things. Only once there's the spark of 'This actually solves my problem' (even though it's ugly, and broken, and just works once every full moon) - only then should the work on improving retention really start. As long as you haven't managed that, keep going and dig deeper.

Thanks for reading, and I hope this was helpful! If you have thoughts or questions, feel free to send me an email to fd (at) fabiandietrich (dot) com. Always happy to connect with like-minded people :)